December 10, 2020...8:14 am

Incsea Agreement

All bilateral agreements between the Soviet Union and NATO members were signed in the official languages of both parties. For all documents published in the Sea Journal, there are unofficial English translations – links are included according to the respective agreements. The agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union on maritime incidents is a bilateral agreement reached in 1972 between the United States and the Soviet Union to reduce the likelihood of a maritime incident between the two countries and, if this happens, to avoid an escalation. Twelve NATO allies had signed bilateral military agreements with the Soviet Union on preventing incidents at sea outside territorial waters. These allies are the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, Norway, Spain, the Netherlands, Canada, Portugal, Greece and Turkey. The United States proposed to conduct discussions on the agreement in 1968 and the Soviet Union accepted it. The talks took place on October 11, 1971 in Moscow and On May 17, 1972 in Washington, D.C. The final agreement was signed at the Moscow Summit on May 25, 1972, by U.S. Secretary of the Navy John Warner and Soviet Navy Commander Sergey Gorchkov. The agreements are listed below with links to English translations, if available. The protocol to this agreement was born from the first meeting of the advisory committee established by the agreement. Each party recognized that additional arrangements for non-military vessels could improve their effectiveness. In the protocol signed on May 22, 1973 in Washington, D.C, each side pledged not to carry out simulated attacks on other people`s non-military ships.

The agreement also provides for: (1) generally, three to five days in advance, measures envisaged that “threaten navigation or aircraft in flight”; (2) information on incidents intended to be channelled through naval attachés belonging to each capital; and (3) annual meetings to review the implementation of the agreement. 2. Ships that meet or practice near the formation of the other contracting party avoid, in accordance with the traffic code, manoeuvres in a way that would hinder the development of training. FOR THE U.S. U.S. GOVERNMENT: Ships and aircraft of contracting parties must not stop launching or abandoning non-military vessels close to the other contracting party in a manner that is dangerous or dangerous to navigation for these vessels. . Aircraft commanders of the contracting parties exercise the utmost caution and caution with respect to the rapprochement with aircraft and ships of the other party operating on the high seas and over the sea, particularly vessels involved in the take-off or landing of aircraft and, in the interests of mutual safety.

, cannot permit: simulated attacks by the simulated use of weapons against aircraft and ships or the performance of various artistic flights over ships. or drop various objects close to home so that they are dangerous to ships or pose a danger to navigation. FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS: . It is also important to note that UNCLOS does not consider the collection of information to be a threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of the coastal state, in violation of the UN Charter. Article 19, paragraph 2, point (c) clearly distinguishes the collection of “threat or use of force” messages, which is discussed in Article 19, paragraph 2, point a), for vessels that have been the subject of unlawful action. This issue was resolved by the Security Council in 1960 after the launch of an American spy plane near Svievovsk, Russia. An attempt by the Soviet Union to let the Security Council decide that the activity of the American spy plane was an act of aggression was clearly defeated by seven to two (with two abstentions), thus confirming the legitimacy of the peace news gathering between the United Nations.